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Abstract So much has been written—and vigorously contested—about ‘organised
crime’ (OC) that the impending fall of this familiar icon may come as a shock,
both to its detractors and to those who take it for granted. Yet that moment may be
upon us, for reasons that this paper will explore, as the European Union shifts the
vocabulary within which policies on police cooperation are articulated. A pivot of
this change is the EU Council Decision on Europol, first debated by the Council in
late 2006 and anticipated as applying from 2010 onwards. This will shift the scope
of Europol’s work from ‘organised crime’ (attributing qualities to criminality) to
‘serious crime’ (concern with impacts and harms falling on individual and collective
victims); will transfer financing of Europol to the Community budget; and so will
initiate parliamentary scrutiny. These issues in security governance are explored
from ‘northern’, ‘southern’ and ‘eastern’ European perspectives and in the contexts
of ongoing enlargement and democratisation of the EU.
The Europol decision and its political context
The political context of the EU’s Council Decision on Europol [8] is the attempt of
the EU to evolve from an entity with multiple legal personalities—the European
Community (first pillar, focusing on the economy and trade) being distinct from the
European Union (second and third pillar, foreign policy and justice and home affairs)—
to a unified EU, as foreseen by the Reform Treaty [4]. The Reform Treaty itself crash-
landed in mid 2008 as result of the Irish ‘no’, following the failure of its predecessor,
the Constitutional Treaty, however some of the structural changes signalled by those
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two treaties survive in more specific legislation. For example, the Reform Treaty
would have amplified the role of the European Parliament, providing the beginnings of
oversight and accountability in European police and judicial cooperation. This broad
development may not now occur on a broad front—however, in relation to Europol
specifically, something similar is provided for by the Europol Decision, the focus for
our discussion here. In other respects, the Europol Decision goes beyond the Reform
and Constitutional treaties, since it virtually does away with the problematic and
controversial policing category of ‘organised crime’. These are significant develop-
ments, reminding us that the political declarations that are most widely trumpeted and
most hotly debated are not the only ones worth attention.
Debated within specialised European policing and political circles from the early
2000s, the Europol Decision was formally proposed by the European Commission in
2006 [8], with agreement being reached between Council and the Parliament in 2007
and 2008, and adoption scheduled for Council in October 2008. The Decision
bypasses (rather than amends) the existing Europol Convention (see below), the
motivation for this being to facilitate the process of agreeing and bringing into effect
any and all future modifications of the legal basis for Europol and its activities, in
response to emerging circumstances and changing policy priorities. By amending a
Council Decision, the competencies of Europol could in future be changed within
months, in contrast to the years or even decades required get ratification of changes
to a Convention. In this sense, the Decision is enabling and ‘flexibilising’ legislation.
The Decision also moves financing of Europol from the Member States to the EU
main budget (from January 2010). This will give the European Parliament a general
role in oversight, since as part of the EU budgetary authority the Parliament would
have some powers of check and scrutiny and, in the last instance, could block all or
(more likely) part of Europol’s budget. Thus the Europol Decision will introduce a
minimal level of accountability of Europol at European level although—as the
European Parliament has put it—further ‘improvements are needed as regards Europol’s
democratic responsibility, especially following the extension of its operational powers’
[12].
Also–the main focus for exploration in this paper–the Europol Decision shifts the
focus of European police cooperation through Europol from ‘organised’ to ‘serious’
crime. In the longer term, this opens up the possibility of Europol priorities being
defined in terms of the seriousness of the harms impacting on individual, collective
or corporate victims.
The Europol Decision is significant for policing studies for several reasons.
The change from a language of ‘organised crime’ to ‘serious crime’ underlines
the importance of understanding crime policy concepts as constructed [6]. It
begins to turn the page on a historical chapter that has been controversial–mafia,
foreigners, OC, transnational organised crime (TOC), and so on [35]. The ‘serious
crime’ language of the Decision resonates with an important theme in contemporary
criminology: harm (see for example [22]). It also provides a fresh opening for
debates on police accountability and on ‘pluralistic’, ‘multilateral’ and ‘anchored’
forms of security governance [18, 32, 27].
These are strongly disputed matters, and views will differ on how to evaluate the
changes occurring at European level. On the one hand, some may fear further
expansion of European policing. There will be easier European cooperation in
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criminal intelligence, it no longer having to be shown before opening a Europol file
that the alleged criminality is ‘organised’ (a real impediment to cooperation in
practice, as will be noted below). On the other hand, many criminologists, lawyers
and human rights advocates will favour the move away from mafia models and
‘othering’, towards the possibility of assessments of social harm as guiding criteria
for police prioritisation and cooperation.
Taking the Europol Decision in the context of the dyspeptic European debate on
the Reform Treaty, we may suggest that the break-out from technical debate over
what counts as ‘organised’ crime, the increased involvement of the European
Parliament, and the prospect of an eventual merging of first and third EU pillars,
may together be seen as a regional ‘marker’ of a global debate on security
governance. ‘Police cooperation’ no longer refers only to cooperation within the
sphere of public policing; it widens to include forms of multilateral or plural policing
in which the private sector and civil society (via greater parliamentary oversight) are
taken as partners by the public police. This may provoke both those strongly in
favour of such developments [32] and those who emphasise the value of the public
police as an ‘anchor’ [27] to more closely link their UK, American, African and
Asian reference points to current developments in the EU.
Wider context: 
public-private 
interface and 
governance 
issues 
Europol: 
from OC 
to serious 
crime
EU structural 
reform: ‘pillars’ 
converge, parliamentary 
oversight enhanced?
The passage of the Europol Decision also raises intriguing questions about the
tension between (i) the development of a harms-based approach to policing and (ii)
the concerns about ‘criminal organisation’ that have been re-ignited—and yet put in
question—by terrorism. Terrorism is seen as more serious than OC, in respect of the
political, reputational, human and other forms of damage caused. Is that because
terrorism is more ‘organised’?—no it is not. Following events including the
bombing of London’s transport system by an amateur team of young people, any
presumption that seriousness of consequences necessarily ties in with sophistication
of organisation would be seen as untenable. The presumed link between criminal
organisation and seriousness has been broken. Criminal organisation remains of
considerable and entirely legitimate concern at an enforcement operational level
(since it depends what policing methods are to be employed). At policy level,
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however, a managerialist approach holds sway, within which categories of crime are
prioritised for action (how intensively to police) on the basic of attributions of
seriousness. This distinction has reached Europol’s door.
Sovereigntist ambivalence
By way of background, of course Europol already exists: it is the EU’s criminal
intelligence agency. What the 2006 ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the
European Police Office’ produces is a change of legal basis. Europol’s present
existence and competences are underpinned by a Convention [13]. The main problem
the EU has experienced with this legal basis has been the difficulty of making
changes, for example to enable Europol to assist Member States’ national police
agencies in relation to forms of criminality that were either new (e.g. cybercrime) or
were unnoticed or of lesser priority in preceding years (e.g. environmental crime).
As the impact assessment on the Commission’s 2006 proposal puts it, there are
‘clear difficulties which are currently experienced with the procedures for
amendment of the Europol Convention. A dynamic and effective European law
enforcement organisation can not function to the best of its capacities if changes
to its main legal instrument can only enter into force 4 or 5 years after they have
been decided at the highest political level’. [9]
A UK House of Commons committee responsible for scrutinising EU legislative
proposals supported change, saying
‘We recognised that EUROPOL can make a useful contribution to the prevention
and detection of serious cross-border organised crime. We also recognised that
circumstances can change quickly and that it is desirable that EUROPOL should
be able to respond to change without avoidable delay. We had no difficulty,
therefore, in accepting the case for replacing the EUROPOL Convention by a
Decision made under the EU Treaty’. (Capitalisation as in original) [25]
The Europol Decision contains provisions to shift the financing of Europol from
member state contributions to the European Community budget. This will have the
effect of making Europol financially answerable to the European Parliament, to
the satisfaction of the latter [12], which has been demanding an ‘improvement of
parliamentary scrutiny’ for some time [11]). In these terms, the Council Decision
represents modest but discernable movement along the accountability road,
seemingly not acknowledged by some commentators (for example, Peers speaks
of ‘no enhancement of supervision by the European Parliament’[29]). The positive
movement would be further enhanced by the EU Reform Treaty, if agreed, since
this would add a power for national parliaments to scrutinise future legislation on
justice and home affairs, including future modifications of or additions to the
Europol Decision.
It is in this context that one may assess the change in Europol’s sphere of
competence, from those crimes which are ‘organised’, to a wider set of criminal acts
that are considered to be ‘serious’ even if they do not meet criteria for ‘OC’. In the
first instance, a set of ‘serious’ crimes is represented by a list annexed to the
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Decision,1 a list that in future could be amended by further decisions of the Council.
Central to our present purposes:
‘The proposal extends the mandate of Europol to criminality which is not
strictly related to organised crime. This will ease support provided by Europol
to Member States in relation to cross-border criminal investigations where
involvement of organised crime is not demonstrated from the start […] One of
these improvements is to ensure that Europol can assist the competent
authorities of the Member States in combating specific forms of serious crime,
without the current limitation that there must be factual indications that an
organised criminal structure is involved. […] [Thus] Article 4. Competence. 1.
The competence of Europol shall cover serious crime affecting two or more
Member States, in particular organised crime and terrorism’ [4].
Council agreement on the proposal now does away with ‘the current limitation
that… an organised criminal structure is involved’ [4]. ‘Organised’ crime that is also
‘serious’ would continue to fall within Europol’s remit; however the removal of any
need to show that it is ‘organised’ can be expected to change police vocabulary as
well as cooperation practices. Reading though the documents, there is a preponderance
of references to ‘serious’ crime (including a few variants such as ‘serious offences’,
‘serious crime and terrorism‘, and ‘serious forms of international crime’). There are
fewer references to ‘organised’ crime—most of which clearly are not advocating the
concept but are referring to its limitations, from the perspective of the authors of the
document (see above quote).
This is by no means the first time that such a proposal has been put on the table.
In 2002, Denmark proposed that Europol should be allowed to assist in cases of
‘serious international crime when two or more Member States are affected in such a
way as to require a common approach by the Member States owing to the scale,
significance and consequences of the offences concerned’ [2]. That proposal would
have removed the condition that an ‘organised criminal structure’ be involved, so for
example it would have allowed Europol to assist in cases of lone fraudsters or
killers. However, by the time the proposal was agreed in 2003, it had reverted to the
following hybrid: ‘serious international crime where there are factual indications or
1 The list of crimes referred to by the Europol Decision (pp 52-53) is as follows: participation in a criminal
organisation, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and child
pornography, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, illicit trafficking in
weapons, munitions and explosives, corruption, fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the
European Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the
European Communities' financial interests, laundering of the proceeds of crime, counterfeiting currency,
including of the Euro, computer-related crime, environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in
endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and varieties, facilitation of unauthorised entry
and residence, murder, grievous bodily injury, illicit trade in human organs and tissue, kidnapping, illegal
restraint and hostage-taking, racism and xenophobia, organised or armed robbery, illicit trafficking in
cultural goods, including antiques and works of art, swindling, racketeering and extortion, counterfeiting
and piracy of products, forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein, forgery of means of
payment, illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters, illicit trafficking in nuclear
or radioactive materials, trafficking in stolen vehicles, rape, arson, crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships, sabotage.
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reasonable grounds for believing that an organised criminal structure is involved and
two or more Member States are affected in such a way as to require a common
approach by the Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of
the offences concerned’ [3]. In other words, OC had been re-instated. A similar and
previous proposal of Sweden and Belgium was rejected by the European Parliament
on the basis that, whilst a move from ‘organised’ to ‘serious’ crime was acceptable,
the manner in which the proposal was framed would have perpetuated a purely
intergovernmental approach to European policing and would not have been a step in
the direction of accountability to the Parliament [11, 24]. Thus the question of the
widening of Europol’s roles and tasks and the question of its accountability have
been linked points of struggle for some years.
As of 2007, political (and as we will indicate below academic) debate remained.
On the organised/serious question, a European Council Europol Working Party noted
that ‘Some delegations underlined that Europol should focus on combating
organised crime’ [16]. This remaining attachment to OC stems from several quite
distinct sources. The first is the well-known attachment of some EU member states
to the maintenance of sovereignty in the area of justice, freedom and security, an
attachment causing the UK and some others to vacillate over or even block
otherwise acceptable initiatives, for fear that they may widen EU competences. This
attachment motivated one of the UK’s ‘red lines’ on the Reform Treaty, resulting in
agreement over an ‘opt out’ provision for the UK on EU justice and police matters.
The UK has been to the fore in pressing for pragmatic solutions to police
cooperation, exchange of data in line with ‘the principle of availability’, and tasking
of enforcement agencies according to criteria of the harm caused by crime. The harm
approach first became explicit in domestic policing in the UK in relation to drug use,
possession and trafficking (‘the drugs that do the most harm’). Harm then became
quite a generalised principle in UK policing [33], even if the title of the Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) ‘hedges its bets’ over the referents ‘organised’
and ‘serious’ crime. But, despite the commitment at national level to using concepts
of harm to steer priority-setting (or at least to develop and modify concepts of harm
so that they are compatible with politically acceptable enforcement priorities)—and
in spite of sighs of impatience within the UK enforcement community with
‘southern’ commitment to language and concepts of mafia and OC—still the UK
suffered ‘cold feet’ in arguing the case for serious crime at European level. This is
simply because OC, as a more restricted concept than serious crime, provides a more
limited definition of boundaries of Europol competence, and so is more compatible
with sovereigntist concerns. Hence, in 2007,
‘The Minister of State at the Home Office (Mr Tony McNulty) told us that the
Government supports the proposal to replace the EUROPOL Convention by a
Decision under the EU Treaty. […] But the Government had reservations about
some of the provisions of the draft Decision. The Minister said that the
Government would, for example, consider whether there might be circum-
stances to justify the involvement of EUROPOL in crime that is serious but
which is not strictly “organised crime”; but it would be very cautious about an
enlargement of EUROPOL’s remit that would divert it from its principal focus
on the analysis of criminal intelligence’ [25].
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Why this caution? The historical record suggests that the British government is
not so much worried about an expansion of police cooperation per se. Rather, the
government is concerned not to give the political opposition an opportunity to attack
it for ‘selling our sovereignty down the river’. Indeed, the government took quite a
risk by not opposing the proposal contained in the Decision for funding of Europol
to be borne by the EU core budget, with the implication of some degree of
accountability to the European Parliament. The House of Commons European
Scrutiny Committee [26] was told by the Home Office Minister ‘that the
Government would prefer EUROPOL to remain funded directly by the Member
States. It could accept the change to Community funding only if it did not increase
expenditure’. Thus the UK quietly accepted the principle of funding of Europol
through the EU budget, and the modest beginnings of police accountability through
the European Parliament, in spite of the danger of a sovereigntist backlash.
Another aspect of UK concern related to the practicality of proposals. The House
of Commons Home Affairs Committee put this concern in the following manner.
‘Policing co-operation across the EU. […] 6. We believe that the creation of
Europol has been a positive development in facilitating police co-operation,
particularly by building confidence and knowledge between Member States.
[But] We do not believe Europol has yet achieved its full potential […] its work
appears to be hampered by the varying degrees of co-operation it receives from
other Member States. [Thus] 7. The Commission’s recent proposal further to
extend the powers of Europol will require careful examination by the UK
Government. In the light of the evidence we have received from UK police, it
does not appear to us that there is a pressing need for a further extension of
powers […]’ [26].
If we read this in combination with the previously mentioned worries over
sovereignty, then we may discern a disinclination amongst MPs, and of the police
representatives who briefed them, to extend the boundaries of an EU agency whose
levels of functioning and governance fall short of optimal. On balance, however, the
shift from ‘organised’ to ‘serious’ crime, and the balancing of inter-governmental
tasking of Europol by modest oversight by the European Parliament, were seen as
being practical, desirable and achievable.
‘Serious’ and ‘organised’ in relation to state capture and elite crime
Turning briefly to some southern EU member states, political concerns differ
somewhat. There seems to be less political (‘sceptical’ or sovereigntist) concern over
the third pillar of the EU, indeed over the EU generally. On those grounds alone,
European Parliamentary oversight would be unproblematic.
However, the re-casting of Europol interests from ‘organised’ to ‘serious’ crime is
quite another matter, because of cultural and historical attachments to concepts and
language of OC, mafia and so on. For example, Italian post-war history, policy,
media and indeed criminology indicates a depth of popular as well as political
engagement with the idea of crime being ‘organised’. Such commitments extend into
the European research community and there have been valiant attempts to maintain,
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rehabilitate, make ‘scientific’ and render quantifiable the category of OC, in order to
support its continuing use as the framing concept for European police priority-
setting, management and reporting [30], attempts that have been criticised by some
[34]. Such specific definitional difficulties add to institutional difficulties observed in
police reporting in practice (see for example [31].
The debate on how to characterise Euro-crime is by no means only between
‘north’ and ‘south’. There is also a strong ‘eastern’ dimension, which has a
discomforting tie-in with the evolution of the European Union. Aleksandar Fatić
paints a picture of crime in the Balkans that is (i) serious, (ii) organised and (iii), it is
alleged, tolerated by the EU, as part of the price to be paid for the political journey of
the Balkans from ‘east’ to ‘west’.
‘In Montenegro, the government of Prime Minister Milo Đukanović was forced
to resort to cigarette-smuggling rings for support in order to finance the state
budget and the loyal party elite necessary to maintain a hold on power, while in
Serbia organised crime was more ‘classic’ in shape and reminiscent of the
criminal rings that operated in the US during the prohibition or in Europe in the
1960s. In Albania, the general poverty and cultural stereotypes allowed for
the development of human trafficking, and the traditional use of Kosovo as a
part of the route for smuggling heroin from the middle east to western Europe
accounted for the attempts by Kosovar separatists to run a developed heroin
racket in order to fund terrorist actions against the Serbian security forces
and, ultimately, an independence war in 1999. […] In all these cases,
criminals played a key role in reinforcing the political leaders’ [17].
There is a strand in European police intelligence thinking that orientates to such
questions by defining the worst crime ‘threats’ as being those that are most resistant
to policing, because of their organisational and technical sophistication and,
particularly, because of their embeddedness in political structures [14].2,3 A
statement to that effect occurred in the Europol’s 2006 Organised Crime Threat
Assessment, or OCTA [14]. It did not recur in the 2007 OCTA [15]. By way of
context, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU took place in January
3 In a similar vein, the present author recalls a discussion with a senior UK police officer who, gesturing to
the world outside the window, described the agency as being continuously ‘under attack’ (and he did not
mean by civil liberty critics). The point for present purposes is that, should sophisticated crime groups
succeed in seriously degrading the ability of a police agency to function, then the priorities of that agency
could be regarded as somewhat moot. The survival instinct predisposes policing agencies and their
ministries (where neither corrupt nor constrained by other political priorities) to attend first and foremost
to those criminals and their allies having the highest ability to neutralise policing. In this perspective,
considerations of other harms become secondary.
2 The 2006 Organised Crime Threat Assessment of Europol puts it this way: ‘The model adopted in this
threat assessments points to the types of OC groups that must be regarded as the most dangerous […] the
focus should be on OC groups displaying structural or functional qualities supporting the resistance of
these groups to dismantling attempts. [...] The main threatening aspects of the groups are, first, the
overwhelming obstacles in dismantling them because of their international dimension or influence, and
second, their level of infiltration in society and economy’[14].
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2007. The situation in these countries is seen as not being satisfactory in relation to
judicial reform, corruption and organised crime, nevertheless these countries were
admitted to the EU, with continuing membership being made subject to ‘verification’
procedures [10]. This top level compromise might have contributed to the dropping
of these issues in Europol’s 2007 report. Ironically, we may have EU shyness over
the justice and home affairs implications of enlargement to thank for a movement
away from public drum-banging about ‘OC’.
On reflection, neither OC nor serious crime concepts go far enough to be capable
of capturing some realities: one would have to expand both concepts to take in elite
crime locally and (more radically) EU accommodation regionally. However, it would
not be the first time that market opening and facilitation has been rather dirty (see for
example [20]). Not only in central and eastern Europe: the British Aerospace affair
(see [1] and [19]) indicates another accommodation, whose negative value has yet to
be fully assessed—although investigations by the US Department of Justice, the
OECD [28] and even by Eurojust [7], a companion agency to Europol, may provide
some yardsticks. One may wonder whether crime in which political elites are
involved or complicit could ever effectively be tackled by agencies of the states
concerned, acting alone, be they the Bulgarian police or the UK’s Serious Fraud
Office. Perhaps there are circumstances in which one should be somewhat grateful
for international assistance.
In summary, whilst the cameo presentations given above of ‘northern’, ‘southern’
and ‘eastern’ constructions of the issues involved in understanding and defining
crime seriousness may be somewhat stereotypical, they reflect culturally and
politically recognisable starting points that, if brought into contact with each other,
throw up serious questions about each. In UK government discourse and research,
seriousness is constructed in terms of harms falling upon individuals and collective
interests, translating those impacts into financial costs, then adding the general costs
of prevention and the costs of responses to (known) crime events (see generally [23];
specifically on OC, [5]). Somewhat against this mainstream, there runs a critical
discourse on wider harms, not all of which may be represented in criminal law or
adequately policed or regulated—such as environmental spoilage, financial market
manipulation, state crime and toleration of corruption.
From a ‘southern’ perspective arises a preoccupation with the ‘organised-ness’ of
crime—expressed through such concepts as the international reach of criminality, its
structures, use of legitimate business structures, capacity for violence, etc. [15]—the
harmfulness of these organisational qualities of the phenomena culturally and
historically being seen as so obviously harmful that there is no need to check upon
impacts on victims.
From ‘eastern’ locations can be seen most clearly an interleaving of crime with
elites, markets, the judiciary and police—in other words, systemic or institutional
harms, about which western European countries may have cultivated a domestic
blindness.
It does not follow, from the heterogeneity of these concerns, that all of
them necessarily would have to be encompassed in any eventual European
Union formulation of seriousness and priority-making. However it does seem
both politically inevitable and potentially helpful that discussion involves their
acknowledgement.
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Conclusion
This paper draws attention to the EU Europol Decision, and especially to the manner
in which it changes the sphere of police cooperation through Europol, from
‘organised crime’ (how criminality is constituted) to ‘serious crime’ (who and how it
harms). The Decision also provides for a role for the European Parliament, as part of
the budgetary authority, in oversight of Europol. Both changes can be seen as being
in line with the wider changes that would have been put in place by the EU Reform
Treaty, with its merging of first and third pillars—a prospect that calls for further
analysis in terms of governance of the expanding private/public policing space. An
important and yet–to-be–clarified aspect of this public-private merging concerns the
conditions under which Europol acquires personal data from commercial sources
(everyday financial transactions, etc).4
Normatively, where could one stand in this debate? Several major problems with
the concepts of OC are acknowledged: its fuzzy boundaries (how many people? over
what time period? with or without threats or violence? etc!); its political partiality
(tendency to focus upon foreigners and away from corporate crime); and the
difficulties of reporting against it in a meaningful and consistent manner. The
concept generates more heat than light. It causes difficulties for police priority-
setting, management, intelligence, reporting—and hence for the prospects for
accountability. In this perspective, a movement away from OC has practical and
political attractions.
However, it must be admitted that efforts to operationalise seriousness and harm
are in their infancy. Some of the critical work that arguably is most interesting has a
fine intellectual and political edge, but it is not very close to existing police,
administrative or private sector information systems. By contrast, some allegedly
‘scientific’ approaches look so much to data availability and quality that they
commit manifest absurdities—for example by including in estimates of harmfulness
of offences the discretionary costs of policing them. Such an approach can only form
a positive feedback loop, in which whatever has been most attended to in the past
becomes assessed as most harmful and most deserving of future action. To avoid
such automatism, harm measures should have nothing to do with response costs.
Undoubtedly, the technical challenges in defining harms and seriousness in a
manner that is useful for prioritising and steering European policing will be found no
less difficult than those of defining and estimating OC.5 The considerable advantage
of a focus on harm/seriousness, however, is that it widens out the debate, from
enforcement agency staff, analysts and allied researchers (practitioner-experts on the
‘organised-ness’ of crime groups), to wider public and civic domains (a diverse set
4 As the Home Office Minster put it, possibly evading the main matter of principle involved in private-
public data exchange: ‘At present there are no formal agreements between Europol and public or private
entities relating to the provision of commercial data to Europol. However, the Government's view is that
where that would involve the processing of personal data from public or private entities, it must take place
exclusively via the Europol national units. A new legal instrument to regulate Europol's activities [the
Council Decision] is currently under negotiation in the Justice and Home Affairs Council. In the context of
that negotiation, the question of the provision of commercial data to Europol has yet to be discussed.’ [21]
5 van Duyne, P., 2008, personal communication.
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of actors having a variety of interests in defining harm/seriousness). It then will fall
to criminologists and others to take up the challenge of illuminating the assumptions,
choice points, data pools and methodologies for unpacking seriousness in terms of
harm.
In conclusion, the shift from ‘organised’ to ‘serious’ crime, as signalled by the
Europol Decision, opens up possibilities for police/public/parliamentary debate—
possibilities that up to now have been impeded by arcane and ethnicised debates
over what constitutes ‘organisedness’. The Europeanisation of financing foreseen by
the Decision, and hence the beginning of accountability to the European Parliament,
puts a material floor under an otherwise ungrounded governance debate. From these
points of view the Europol Decision may be afforded a conditional welcome. There
remains the challenge of how adequately to represent, within an over-arching
concept of crime seriousness, the systemic damage done to political culture and
institutions by EU and national elites’ accommodations to market crimes, corruption
and cover-up. This is a challenge that should be taken up internationally.
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